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Arguments for moral nihilism—the view that there are no moral truths—are criticized by
showing that their major premises suggest epistemic or intellectual nihilism—the view that
no beliefs are reasonable, justified, ought to be believed, and so on. Insofar as intellectual
nihilism ought be rejected, this shows that the major premises of arguments for moral nihilisms
ought to be rejected also.
1
Philosophical discussions of moral problems seem to be attempts to discern the truth about
the morality of abortion, the treatment of animals, the wrongness of racial discrimination, and
what we should do regarding other pressing practical ethical issues.
But some people claim that there are no truths about what’s right and wrong, good and bad,
and just and unjust: there is nothing that, morally, we should do, and nothing we ought not to
do either. This view is often called moral or ethical nihilism. In it, morality is “annihilated”:
the world is said to contain no moral value.
Some influential philosophers have argued for moral nihilism. If their arguments are
sound, the implications are significant: nothing is right or wrong, genuine moral progress
is impossible, there have never been any moral mistakes, and there really is no reasoning in
ethics, since there are no truths to discover or reason towards.
Fortunately, there are no good reasons to accept moral nihilism, and better reasons to deny
it. This is because all the common arguments for it have at least one major premise that we
have very good reason to reject because these premises suggest not just moral nihilism, but
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intellectual or epistemological nihilism—according to which that there are no ways we ought
to reason, that no beliefs are reasonable or justified, that nothing is known, that nothing is
intellectually valuable.
If we have good reasons to reject these intellectually nihilistic implications (and most
moral nihilists think we do), this provides strong resources to reject moral nihilisms. Insofar
as we think that there are ways we ought to reason and conduct our cognitive lives, we have
reason to reject arguments for moral nihilism since premises given in its favor have these
rationally unacceptable consequences for understanding reasoning itself. Seeing this helps us
see at least that there are no good reasons to accept moral nihilism.
2
To defend these claims, we can survey the major nihilistic arguments from twentieth-century
ethics which are not significant improvements over early arguments.1
First, logical positivists were moral nihilists. A.J. Ayer argued that moral judgments are
not true because they are neither true nor false. He claimed they are merely emotional ex-
pressions, “Boo’s!” and “Hooray’s!” for and against various actions. Positivists were quite
impressed by science, but highly suspicious of anything “metaphysical,” including ethics.
Their major premise in their argument against ethical truth, however, was that any claim
that isn’t true in virtue of meaning or is not empirically verifiable is neither true nor false.
While moral judgments are like that, so are judgments about what’s reasonable, or justified,
or known, or should be believed or rejected.
Judgments like these are made about ordinary beliefs and issues in science, but no sci-
entific experiment can be done to determine whether claims like these are true, and these
intellectual qualities are not revealed merely by thinking about the meanings of the words
stated in intellectual judgments.
So positivism suggests that intellectually evaluative judgments are never true also. It might
suggest an intellectual emotivism on which people are only cheering for believing some claim
when they claim it to be reasonable or supported by strong evidence and booing when they
claim the opposite. Positivists thought their views were reasonable, but it is doubtful that they
thought they were only expressing their positive emotions for their own beliefs. They thought
they were saying something that’s true, but surprisingly, their own theories imply they were
not. Since we have reason to think that logical reasoning is not the expression of emotions,
we have reason to reject the premise that motivated positivists to accept moral nihilism.
1Any text or anthology on ethical theory provides this history. See, e.g., Terrence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-
Landau, eds. The Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006).
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Later ethical emotivists weren’t motivated by positivism. C.L. Stevenson’s emotivism was
first, based on the observations that emotions sometimes get expressed in making moral judg-
ments and that we sometimes use them to try to influence people. But this premise is part of
a sound argument for emotivism only if it’s true that any judgments that sometimes express
emotions and are used to influence people are never true, i.e., are merely emotive. But if that’s
true, then, since intellectual judgments are like that, they are never true also.
Stevenson claimed that moral judgments have a motivational “magnetism,” that sincere
moral judgment necessarily motivates people towards action. This is doubtful, but if it’s true,
then, following Hume’s theories of belief and desire, moral judgments are not beliefs since
only emotions and desires can motivate in such a way. Emotivism is suggested again, but
intellectual judgments also have this kind motivational impact, if moral judgments do. It
would be as odd for someone to judge that some belief of his is entirely unreasonable, totally
unjustified, and something she ought not accept, yet feel no pull at all towards rejecting that
belief. Intellectual emotivism is suggested again.
Finally, Stevenson said that he just can’t picture what a “moral fact” would be like, what
would make a moral judgment true. But anyone puzzled about this should also be puzzled
about what would make an intellectual or epistemological judgment true. It’s not at all clear
what “in the world” makes it true that something is evidence for some belief, or that some
evidence is sufficient evidence, and some beliefs are rational, justified, known, ought to be
held (or rejected) and so on. Ontological obscurity is common to both.
The theme that is emerging is this: when moral nihilists argue for their position, they
do this by claiming that moral judgments have various features, and since they have these
features, they are never true. Some of these claims about what moral judgments are like
are quite plausible (e.g., that they are not empirically confirmable), and other times they are
doubtful (e.g., that they are necessarily motivational). But any of these claims can be part of a
sound argument for moral nihilism only if the (usually unstated) premise validly linking them
to the conclusion is true: that any judgment having these features is never true, either because
such judgments are neither true nor false or because there is nothing to make them true.
But this premise, as we have seen, has radical implications for judgments beyond morality,
most notably intellectual and epistemic judgments that are essential to reasoning and science.
It suggests that no judgments like these are ever true. This is a radically irrationalist conse-
quence. If we have reason to think that we sometimes can reason, and that judgments describ-
ing how we ought to reason and what we ought to believe (are justified, are rational, and so
on) are sometimes true, then we have reason to reject these arguments for moral nihilism.
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Writings of recent moral nihilists, such as R.M. Hare, J.L. Mackie, and Gilbert Harman, con-
firm this theme that arguments for moral nihilisms have these intellectually nihilistic conse-
quences.
First, they note the existence of moral disagreements and argue that this is best explained,
in part, by the hypothesis that there are no moral facts: if there were such facts, then more peo-
ple would “see” them and there’d be less moral disagreement. But it seems clear that there’s
quite a lot of intellectual and epistemic disagreement also. Disagreements about what’s rea-
sonable, rational, and known, and how we ought to reason, are common. Is the best explana-
tion of these facts that there are no intellectual facts? That’s doubtful.
And if it is, what, if anything, would make it true that anyone should accept the best
explanation? On intellectual nihilism, nothing makes that true, so it’s not true that we should
believe what these nihilists say we should believe. Perhaps they have only strong feelings and
desire that we agree with them?
Many of these philosophers also claim that moral qualities, like rightness and goodness,
do not explain anything in the physical world—they do not have causal influence—and so we
should not believe in them. But intellectual and epistemic qualities, if they exist, seem as
unexplanatory and causally inert as moral ones. If this is a reason to reject them, then that’s a
reason to think that the claim that we should believe only in what helps explain the physical
world is not true either. Again, these arguments for moral nihilism are unsuccessful.
5
This theme can be developed with all the common arguments for moral nihilisms.2 They all
have a premise that suggests a radical intellectual and epistemological nihilism that conflicts
with much of what we reasonably believe.
This kind of nihilism could be true: there’s no clear reason why it couldn’t be. But insofar
as we believe, and believe reasonably, that we should have evidence and reasons for our beliefs,
we should be consistent in our beliefs, and that we should change our views when pressed by
the weight of the evidence, we have good reason to reject these arguments. Rational reflection
suggests that judgments about reasoning are sometimes true, after all, they are not always
false and are not merely emotive, and rational insight allows us to see what follows from this,
including that we should reject the major premises of the arguments for moral nihilism.
2I do this in my 2005 University of Rochester Ph.D. dissertation, Truth in Ethics & Epistemology: A Defense
of Normative Realism.
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Thus, we can, and should, reject moral nihilism, and reject it for good reasons. And the
method to rationally investigate the nature of morality is the same we should use to investigate
what is moral. This method is to identify unambiguous and precise moral conclusions and
then identify the reasons. If we make all the premises explicit and reveal the assumptions that
are too often left tacit, we’ll be on the road to making moral progress, first in thought and then
in action.
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